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CONSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS OF EMPLOYEE ACCESS TO THE
FEDERAL COURTS: PROMOTION AND
TERMINATION
ANTHONY J. MOHR*
STEPHEN D. WILLETT**
INTRODUCTION
In the past three years civil rights filings in federal court have
increased markedly, and the category experiencing the largest surge
in litigation is employment, where complaints have jumped almost
200%.' Employment complaints once involved almost exclusively
matters of prejudice and bigotry, but while discrimination with re-
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1. Statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts show
the following trends in federal court litigation over the past three years:
AREA OF LITIGATION
Civil Rights- Total .................
V otin g ...........................
Em ploym ent .....................
Accommodations ..... ...........
W elfare .............. ...........
Other .........................
N .A .R .A ., 1966 ......... ...........
Fair Labor Standards
A c t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Labor-Management
Relations (1948) ..................
Labor-Management
Reporting and
D isclosure Act ....................
Social Security
R eview s ..........................
Economic Stabilization
A c t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Selective Service Act ................
Percent Change
1970 1971 1972 1972 over 1970
3,985
85
344
217
173
3,166
3,268
5,138
123
757
261
132
3,865
2,725
6,133
170
1,015
287
149
4,512
2,530
2,176 2,182 2,195
1,475 2,101 2,454
53.9
100.0
195.1
32.3
-13.9
42.5
-22.6
09
66.4
121 116 147 21 5
1,735 1,792 2,288
.. .. 376
447 695 281
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spect to hiring remains a common area of judicial struggle,' an
increasing number of plaintiffs are invoking federal jurisdiction
when, the authors think, their cases should be resolved elsewhere.
This article's purpose is to examine federal jurisdiction over a new
type of employment situation: where a person claims that by not
promoting him or by terminating him, an employer is depriving him
of' property and liberty within the meaning of the fifth :' and four-
teenth' amendments to the United States Constitution. The authors
2. Discrimination is a relatively new area, though to be sure much older than promotion
and termination. In the past ten years it has been rather well defined thanks to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. Before this statute discrimina-
tion in employment could be divided into two categories: public or quasi-public employment
and private employment. In the first instance discrimination involves state action and
thereby removes all question about Federal jurisdiction. The 1964 Act expanded Federal
jurisdiction throughout the private sector in connection with hiring, promotion and termina-
tion where discrimination allegedly occurs,
Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 established a system for handling disputes involv-
ing discrimination in the private sector. Although even before 1964 most of the public agencies
had established procedural guidelines and extra-judicial machinery to handle these types of
grievances, a whole new system had to be established to grapple with private industry,
associations, organizations and the like. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
was intended to do just that. Its function was, and still is, to seek the elimination of employ-
ment practices that are unlawfully discriminatory by informal means leading to voluntary
compliance with the statute. Where the Commission determines that discrimination charges
are well founded, it attempts to obtain voluntary compliance. When these efforts are unsuc-
cessful. the Commission brings suit in Federal court. Feteke v. United States Steel Corp.,
424 F.2d 33:1 (rd Cir. 1970). The procedure is elaborately set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 200((e)
(5)(c). (d). (e).
In Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969), the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a prerequisite to the institution of an action in Federal district
court was that one allege discrimination and follow the EEOC procedure before filing. This
holding, however, has been eroded by more recent cases. For example, in Culpepper v.
Reynoolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970) a black employee charged racial discrimina-
tion in promotion. No complaint was filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion within the 90 days after the alleged discriminatory act. Nevertheless, the court in
('ulpepper decided that failure to comply with the statute did not preclude his bringing the
action in a Federal court. The upshot of this and other cases like it is a belief that a grievant
need not follow EEOC procedures and may bring an action directly into Federal court when-
ever discrimination is alleged. The authors believe this is an extreme reading of Culpepper,
and a misreading of the statute; and that the machinery in the Civil Rights Act should be
strictly followed.
:3. U.S. CONsr. amend. V. The amendment provides in part: "No person shall be .
d(e)rived of life', liberly, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
he taken or ptiolic use, without just coin pensation."
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The amendment provides in part:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
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EMPLOYEE SUITS
contend that constitutionally protected interests are involved under
very narrow and specific fact situations, and that many of these new
complaints do not belong in federal court. Moreover, it is contended
that in certain instances, the federal courts are not the optimum
forum for employment litigation even if a federal question exists.
Other agencies, arbitration panels, and review boards are better
equipped to handle certain disputes and can resolve them more
quickly and skillfully than United States district judges.
Employment lawsuits involving liberty and property interests
appear to follow a standard format. The plaintiff asserts that as a
matter of right he deserves to be retained on a job or elevated to a
higher rank. The taproot of this logic is the Constitution, making
the litigation a war of affidavits in which each side attempts to
maneuver the case into, or away from, the coverage of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.5 But the constitutional meanings of prop-
erty and of liberty have changed over the years, and to appreciate
their modern definitions, some history is worthwhile, particularly
with respect to the property concept.
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY-EXPANDING CONCEPTS
Property
Probably the one constant feature of property through the years
is that it never has been seen as a natural right, but rather a deliber-
ate construction by society.' Moreover, what the property concept
includes has varied with culture and historical period. The concept
has been the subject of much thought and even more verbiage. One
scholar wrote that property "never has been, is not, and never can
be of definite content. The paradigm of a Sanskrit verb of a thou-
sand forms could not approach in diversities the phases of that
concept in any single time and place."' As it appears in the
Constitution, the term is the product of many forces which, though
perhaps clear to the founding fathers, continue to be amorphous in
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
5. In this article we are exclusively concerned with situations in which state action is
present. Otherwise there is no question that the court would lack jurisdiction and would never
reach the liberty and property issues.
6. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-72 (1962).
7. See Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691
(1938).
8. Id. at 696.
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the minds of modern historians. Even among the Greeks the term
was ambiguous,!, and scholars agree that "the very limited records
of' Rome's legal development through six centuries contain no con-
sistent doctrine" with respect to property."' The importance of the
Feudal era was that in a system at once political and agrarian,
collective ownership was superimposed upon private ownership."
This union of the concepts of public and private law had
momentous consequences. Private law deals with the asser-
tion of one individual's right and powers against others.
Public law deals with duties of individuals to the state,
some negative, some affirmative. One is characteristically
the field of individualism; and the fact that private law in
its origins was predominantly property law must certainly
have greatly stimulated absolutistic thinking about private
rights. Public law, on the contrary, is the first of social
duties. Writing of the political aspect of the union of these
ideas in feudalism, Dr. McIlwain has pointed out the influ-
ence upon English theories of government of feudalism's
"mingling. . .of the ideas of proprietary right and govern-
mental authority . . . and the corresponding fusion of pub-
lic and private law." Its influence on private law was per-
haps greater. Ancient proprietary rights of familial and
other associations in the land . . . acquired under feudal-
ism a partially political character; and consequently, as
individual rights in land became stronger they, too, did not
9. The end to which Plato's thought was directed was social solidarity. He believed in
education as a tool for achieving a spirit of unity, but education only of the highest classes,
who alone were considered deserving. Because unchallenged government was essential to
social solidarity, and because private property promoted individual selfishness with resulting
resistance to the city-state, Plato attacked private property in The Republic. At one point,
in The Laws, he promoted communism as his ideal. Nevertheless he proposed individual
phssession of land (without powers of alienation) with communal use, and restriction of
offspring so as to safeguard enjoyment. Aristotle's thought was different: he recognized pri-
vate property as a part of the existing Greek institutions, and he even went so far as to exalt
private property. Aristotle attacked Plato's communal doctrines and his ideal of unity, de-
claring that the truly ideal state would "enable the inhabitants to live temperately and
liberally in the enjoyment of property." See ARISTOTLE, POiITICS (Jowett trans. 1885) 11.5,
§§ 4-17; 11.12, § 12. Aristotle's own ideal occurs at id. at 11.5 § 10; 11.6, §§ 8-9; VII.5, §§ 1
and 15 et seq. Basically Aristotle asserted that private control would speed development of
those worthy human qualities that, more than communism, would preserve his ideal society.
Philbrick, supra note 7, at 697-98.
10. Philbrick, supra note 7, at 700.
11. Id. kit 707 & n.50.
[Vol. 8
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become merely proprietary, but became the basis of per-
sonal status in private and public law. 2
Despite the waning of the Middle Ages, individual interests in
property continued to be preferred to the interests of society. The
slogan of the French Revolution may have been liberty, equality,
and brotherhood, but subsequent manifestos were quick to shield
property interests from social forces." And this occurred despite
numerous proposals presented during the French Revolutionary pe-
riod to curb private property in the public interest. In America, it
is altogether possible that the reverent attitude toward private prop-
erty that dominated the colonial period would have occurred merely
because of the nation's geography, unsupported by philosophy."
Nevertheless, many plutocrats used natural law philosophy to vin-
dicate their actions. An inevitable companion was John Locke, with
his libertarian doctrines and his conclusion that government has no
other end but the preservation of property.
According to Locke, property included "life, liberty, and es-
tate."' , It was a value standing on its own, though falling far short
of an absolute right.'I In Locke's world a man's estate was the means
of life; and liberty and property were almost a single concept. 7
Inseparable from personality, Locke's property derived from one's
rights in one's person; and this subsumed the right to labor and the
right freely to contract to labor. In his discourse property followed
12. C. MClILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF POIATICAi, THOUGHT IN THE WEST 384 (1932).
13. Philbrick, supra note 7, at 712 n.68. The Declaration read in part, "Property is the
right that each citizen has to the enjoyment of that portion of goods guaranteed him by the
state," and the Constitution of 1793 stated, "no one shall be deprived of the least portion of
his property without his consent, except when public necessity, legally proven, evidently
demands it, and then only on condition of just compensation previously made." This assur-
ance is in some areas stronger than in the United States Constitution, and it was preserved
in later French constitutions: 1 LE COnE CIVII.E 1804-1904: LIVRE Do CENTENAIRE (1904) 336-
37; L. Faucher, Property in 3 Cyc. Pot.. Sci. (J.J. Lawlor ed. 1884); 4 COnE NAPOLEON. SUIVIE
DEU l'ExPosE DES MOTIFS . . . DES RAPPORTS . . . OPINION . . . DES DISCOURTS (1808) 25 et seq.;
1 MOTIFS ET DIScOIIRTS PRONONCES IORS I)E L.A PUBLICATION I)t CODE Civil, (1838) 286 et seq.
14. America's ability to expand westward across a virgin wilderness, relatively free from
im)edancc. should be contrasted with nations like the Soviet Union, which only in the past
26 years has been able to exist secure from external threat. The effect of these two environ-
ments with respect to each nation's organization of political space is too complex for anything
more than a passing comment here. See generally G. GORER & 1. RICKMAN. THE PEOPI.E OF
(;EAT IUSSIA (1949).
15. Philbrick, supra note 7, at 713.
16. Hamilton. Property-According to Locke, 41 YAIE L.J. 864, 869 (1932).
17. Id. at 876.
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directly after slavery," and because it was man's creation, it had the
sacredness which he attached to human life itself."
This system dovetailed nicely into the perceptions of an Amer-
ica "on the make." '' The fourteenth amendment's phrases were
invoked at first on behalf of the right of the working man to his
trade."' Even by the beginning of the Twentieth Century, courts
were not yet distinguishing between liberty and property." In
Children's Hospital v. Adkins, 3 a 1922 case, Judge Van Orsdel
wrote, "it should be remembered that of the three fundamental
principles which underlie government, and for which government
exists, the protection of life, liberty, and property, the chief of these
is property." 4 Small wonder that the framers of the Constitution
handled liberty and property in tandem and kept them together in
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Traces of this early mind-
set persist. "In the annals of the law," writes Hamilton, "property
is still a vestigial expression of personality and owes its current
constitutional position to its former association with liberty."2 '
Undoubtedly property has experienced pronounced legal devel-
opment from a time when it referred simply to landed estates. It has
expanded until now, in the post-industrial era, "the total value
under our law . . .of proprietary rights which have no material
object is probably enormously greater than the value of such rights
in all land and tangible chattels."" There are promissory notes, bills
of exchange, patent rights, and shares of corporate stock. Shortly
after World War II, Congress codified the body of common law that
had developed to protect trademarks and trade names.27 Intellectual
property, another example, is a recent notion. Although the copy-
18. Id.
19. Id. at 868.
20. Id. at 876-77.
21. Id. at 877. See brief of Mr. Justice Campbell in the Slauehter House Cases. 83 U.S.(16 Wall.) 3}6 (1873),
22. Hamilton, supra note 16, at 876-77.
23. 284 F. 613 (D.C. Cir. 1922), aff'd 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
24. Id. at 622. "[Njot that any amount of property is more valuable than the life or
liberty of the citizen, but the history of civilization proves that, when the citizen is deprived
of the free use and enjoyment of his property, anarchy and revolution follow, and life and
liberty are without protection." Id.
25. Hamilton, supra note 16, at 878.
26. Philbrick, supra note 7, at 692.
27. LANFIAM Ac-r, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1963).
[Vol. 8
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1974], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss2/5
19741 EMPLOYEE SUITS
right statutes are old,' the courts only lately have begun to protect
property interests in ideas.'!' Rentalism is so prevalent in the United
States that no discussion of modern property is complete without
mentioning it."' And most recently, the expanding wealth of bu-
reaucracy has created what Professor Charles Reich terms a "new
property." This concept departs from the idea of undisputed owner-
ship in order to cover significant new property interests, including
statutory entitlements." Government largesse, says Reich, "affects
the underpinnings of individualism and independence. It influences
the workings of the Bill of Rights. It has an impact on the power of
private interests, in their relation to each other and to government.
It is helping to create a new society.""2 This largesse takes many
forms, including welfare benefits," unemployment benefits, 4 occu-
pational licenses, '5 direct financial subsidies and grants, : communi-
cations channels, :17 transport routes,3" zoning variances :1 ' and public
housing.'
28. The first copyright act was passed in 1790. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
Present copyright laws are codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216.
29. See, e.g., Healy v. Macy & Co., 277 N.Y. 681, 14 N.E.2d 388 (1938); Kovacs v.
Mutual Broadcasting Sys., 99 Cal. App. 2d 56, 221 P.2d 108 (1950); Kurland v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 40 Cal. 2d 799, 256 P.2d 962 (1953); Belt v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 108 F.
Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1952), aff'd 210 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953). But see unfavorable cases
collected in M. NIMMER. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 167 (1972).
30. See A. TOFFILER. FUTURE SHOCK 60-61, 436-38 (1972).
31. The United States Supreme Court has held that these significant interests are
safeguarded by the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262
(1970) (welfare benefits); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (driver's license); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972) (possessory interest under conditional sales contract).
32. Reich, supra note 6, at 733.
33. Welfare statutes are multifarious. Some of the more significant of these are the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.; the Old Age Benefits Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401
et seq.; and the Needy Families with Children Aid and Services Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et
seq. See generally Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YAIiE LA..l. 1245 (1965).
34. See, e.g., Java v. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev., 317 F. Supp. 875 (N.D.
Cal. 1970), aff'd 402 U.S. 121 (1970), indicating that once a person is deemed entitled to the
benefit, it cannot be arbitrarily denied or cancelled without fulfillment of due process stan-
dards.
35. See, Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses in
California, 14 STAN. L. REV. 553 (1962).
36. Examples would include farm subsidies and academic grants and fellowships. An-
other very important example is the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq.,
2016(a), 2019(b). Tindall v. Hardin, 337 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Pa. 1972) holds that the depriva-
tion of the right to receive benefits under this statute is denial of a statutory entitlement
requiring procedural due process guarantees and protections.
37. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
38. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1963).
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Despite Locke, property has separated from personality, at
least in part.' But the more significant development flows from the
increasing dependence on government and formal institutions for
property rights. Where people once demanded that government
leave them and their property alone, now those sentiments are turn-
ing back on themselves. Citizens are expecting more services and
benefits from their lawmakers, and often what was commenced
purely as a magnanimous gesture by the solons has metamorphosed
into a positive obligation. Social welfare is a good illustration of this
tendency. Originally the statute turned on the notion that welfare
is a gratuity furnished by the state and thus amenable to whatever
condition the state saw fit to impose.2 With the advent of New Deal
legislation, the capricious nature inherent in charity was reduced.
The Social Security Act provided that "A state plan for aid to
dependent children must . . .(4) provide for granting to any indi-
vidual, whose claim with respect to aid to a dependent child is
denied, an opportunity for a fair hearing before such state
agency. . . ,',": Welfare controversies have run the procedural
gamut since the original act, and many politicians and attorneys are
familiar with the large body of experience and law that has emerged
regarding the treatment of welfare recipients. Not only must there
be a "fair hearing," but the procedural methods utilized by the
agency must adhere to a phalanx of safeguards." In the minds of the
39. Zoning statutes exist on the local level. A typical zoning enabling act is presented
and discussed in C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 612-18.
40. See Ruffin v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 301 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. La. 1969),
requiring due process procedures for eviction from public housing.
41. Reich, supra note 6, at 771-74; Hamilton, supra note 16, at 877-78.
42. Reich, supra note 33, at 1245-46.
43. Social Security Act, ch. 531, Title IV, § 402(a)(4), 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (1972).
44. In the past thirty years a large body of experience and law has grown up
,i respef fo e.. f ....b. .. - -d ... f ....- v : C ,,dcrtkc .... a...1,
of economic affairs, or dispensation of benefits such as airline routes or television
licenses. In a general way, the standards which have developed are as follows. (1) The
rules which are to furnish the standard of decision should be clearly formulated in
advance of any action; (2) the rules should be available to the public; (3) every action
should begin with actual notice of the proposed action and a full statement of the
basis for it; (4) the relevant facts should be determined in a proceeding at which the
person or company affected can know the evidence and have an opportunity to rebut
it; factual findings should not be based on hearsay or secret evidence known only to
the agency; (5) the person or company should have the right to be represented by
counsel; (6) there should be a distinct separation between those officials who investi-
gate and initiate action and those who find the facts and make the decision; the latter
[Vol. 8
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courts and populace, welfare benefits have crystallized into a right
to which people are entitled. 5 It is harder to curtail benefits than
to initiate them. Law schools abound with seminars in welfare liti-
gation. 11 Most important, in the minds of those affected, assistance
is not a gratuity, but an essential dole that they fully deserve. 7
The Supreme Court has recognized this attitude and endorsed
it in Goldberg v. Kelly,4 where Justice Brennan said, "It may be
realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property'
than a 'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in this country takes
the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common-law
concepts of property."4 This conclusion was anticipated in Shapiro
v. Thompson,5' 1 a case turning on equal protection and the elusive
right to travel. There Justice Brennan commented in passing that
the appellants could not argue that public assistance benefits are a
"privilege" and not a "right." 5' Indeed, in 1959, in Fleming v.
Nestor,5" the Court recognized that with respect to federal social
security benefits, "[t]he interest of a covered employee under the
Act is of sufficient substance to fall within the protection from arbi-
trary governmental action afforded by the Due Process Clause. 
' 51
officials should be subject to different authority than the former and free of any of
the atmosphere in which the action was begun; (7) the decision, once made, should
be accompanied by findings and reasons; (8) there should be opportunity for review
of the decision within the agency, and, ultimately, in the courts.
Reich, supra note 33, at 1252.
45. Tenbroek and Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance-A Normative
Evaluation, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 237 (1954).
46. Such a class is one of the most popular at Columbia Law School, for example.
Professor Reich has pointed to a "desperate need" for attorneys in the field of social welfare
at the level "where individual rights are at stake." Reich, supra note 33, at 1257 (emphasis
added). See also Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 381 (1965).
47. Reich, supra note 33, at 1255.
48. 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970).
49. Id. at 262 n.8.
50. 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
51. Id. at 627 n.6.
52. 363 U.S. 603 (1959).
53. Id. at 611. The actual case holding did not find a definite property interest in
receiving social security benefits, at least under its particular fact situation involving an alien
who was being deported for communist party membership. In fact the Court indicated that
engrafting a concept of "accrued property rights" upon the social security system would
deprive it of flexibility and boldness in adjusting to the constantly changing conditions which
Congress anticipated. Id. at 610. Nevertheless, the case has been cited more for its dictum
as the Justices have become increasingly willing to find property interests in such largesse.
Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
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That welfare benefits are property under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments is virtually a truism in contemporary life.
A similar transformation of a government benefit into property
obtains with drivers' licenses. Although such a license is not avail-
able as a matter of right, a hearing is required before the state can
revoke it. Although the Supreme Court in Bell v. Burson " never
specifically referred to a driver's license as property, it did classify
it as an "entitlement" to which the relevant constitutional re-
straints applied. 5 Semantics aside, the practical effect of this deci-
sion is yet another expansion of the constitutional property concept.
Property and Public Employment
Public employment is another field where benefits have turned
into important interests" and now are in the process of becoming
54. 402 U.S. 535 (1970).
55. Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued possession
may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses
thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In
such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without the procedural due process
required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). This is but an application of the
general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to termi-
nate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a right or a privilege
I citing casesl.
Id. at 539.
In a similar manner other areas of government largesse have crystallized, if not yet into
property, at least into valuable government benefits constituting such an "important inter-
est" to the individual that they may not be denied in a manner that infringes constitutionally
protected rights. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (tax exemptions); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1963) (unemployment benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 627 n.6 (1968) (welfare benefits); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1970) (wel-
fare benefits).
Denials of public employment are beginning to acquire property dimensions. See notes
56-94 infra and accompanying text. But before this trend they too were treated under this
general principle. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1946); Weiman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960); Torcaso
v. Watkins, :367 U.S. 488 (1960); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1960);
Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1961); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360 (1963); Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S. 11, 17 (1965); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1966); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258 (1967); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1967). See also Willcox, Invasions of
I/ho First Amnendment T7irough Conditioned Public Spending, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1955);
Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
56. See note 55 supra; see also Rozman v. Elliot, 335 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Neb. 1971),
holding that while private employers are not limited by the fourteenth amendment, public
employers are.
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property.57 The shift has followed the steady postwar expansion of
government largesse. At first the courts held that government em-
ployment is not "property." ' Even by 1950 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in Bailey v. Richardson,"5 held that public
employment in general was a "privilege" and not a "right," with the
result that procedural due process guarantees did not apply. The
suit involved a federal employee who was removed from her position
after an investigation produced evidence that she belonged to sub-
versive organizations. Judge Prettyman decided that absent con-
gressional limitation, the President can remove from the civil serv-
ice anyone whose loyalty did not completely satisfy the Chief Execu-
tive."" The Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Clark abstained from
the deliberations and the remaining members of the Supreme Court
split evenly. Subsequently, the notion that government service is a
privilege deteriorated through a series of opinions that have thor-
oughly undermined Bailey v. Richardson. The Court has held that
a public college professor dismissed from a position held under ten-
ure provisions " and college professors and staff members dismissed
during the terms of their contracts " have interests in continued
employment that are safeguarded by due process. Finally in 1971
Justice Blackmun noted that the Supreme Court "now has rejected
the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a govern-
mental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or a 'privilege.' ""
The path was now clear for Connell v. Higginbotham,'6 another
case involving a teacher at a public institution. In that decision a
Florida citizen was relieved for failure to sign an oath of allegiance
required of all public employees, part of which read, "that I do not
believe in the overthrow of the Government of the United States or
of the State of Florida by force or violence. ' '" 5 Deleting that portion
57. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971), all intimat-
ing that such a property interest can exist under certain circumstances. Contra, Sessions v.
State of Conn., 293 F. Supp. 834 (D. Conn. 1968), aff'd, 404 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1968).
58. Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 348 (1900); Ex parte Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888); 2
COOIEY. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 746 n.1 (8th ed. 1927). See also Sessions v. State of
Conn., 293 F. Supp. 384 (D. Conn. 1968), aff'd, 404 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1968).
59. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aft'd by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
60. Id. at 65.
61. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
62. Weiman v. tjpdegraf', :44 U.S. 183 (1952).
63. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1970).
64. 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
65. Id. at 208.
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of the oath, the Justices pointed out that it fell "within the ambit
of decisions of this Court proscribing summary dismissal from pub-
lic employment without hearing or inquiry required by due process.
Slochower v. Board of' Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956)."" These
words are doubly significant when contrasted with the Court's 1950
language in Bailey. There, although the terminated employee did
receive a hearing, the circuit court tartly reminded her that "never
in our history has a Government administrative employee been enti-
tled to a hearing of the quasi-judicial type upon his dismissal from
Government service." 7 The language in Connell v. Higginbotham
intimating that such hearings have become commonplace repre-
sents the philosophical change that has overswept due process and
property. This is especially so since the teacher in Connell v.
Higginbotham was hired without tenure or a formal contract, but
rather with a clearly implied promise of continued employment.
This suggests that the Court tacitly found a property interest in the
case.
Thus, by the end of the 1960's the Supreme Court had uncov-
ered a general property interest in public employment; but it was
not until the twin decisions of Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth"' and Perry v. Sindermann" that they tackled specific factual
issues and began to explore the constitutional borderlands. And
they found the boundary beyond which the Constitution does not
apply.
Roth and Sindermann
David Roth was hired for a probationary period of one academic
year, to be an assistant professor at Wisconsin State University-
Oshkosh. Eventually the college informed him that he would not be
retained beyond that period. The Board of Regents' rules provided
that a non-tenured teacher "dismissed" before the end of the year
may have some opportunity for review of the action, but there was
no real protection for a non-tenured person like Mr. Roth, who sim-
ply was not re-employed.7' Reversing the court of appeals, Justice
Stewart held that the Constitution did not require opportunity for
66. Id. at 208-09.
67. 182 F.2d at 57.
68. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
69. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
70. 408 U.S. at 567.
[Vol. 8
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a hearing in this situation unless Roth could show that despite the
absence of tenure or a formal contract, he had a property interest
in continued employment.7' The Court explained why Roth had no
such interest. by saying:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He
must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to
protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily
lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It
is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to pro-
vide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those
claims.72
Continuing, the Court indicated that property interests are not
created by the Court.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an inde-
pendent source such as state law-rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of enti-
tlement to those benefits. Thus, the welfare recipients in
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, had a claim of entitlement to
welfare payments that was grounded in the statute defining
eligibility for them.
73
This language was the fountainhead of Justice Stewart's subsequent
opinion in Perry v. Sindermann.7 Although the Court reaffirmed
that "the mere showing that he was not rehired in one particular
job, without more, did not amount to a showing of a loss of liberty
• . . or. . . property, ' 75 it affirmed the circuit court because Profes-
sor Sindermann had demonstrated "a genuine . . . interest in con-
tinued employment at Odessa Junior College. He alleged that his
71. 408 U.S. at 578. Or in the alternative the decision not to rehire him somehow
deprived him of "liberty." Id. at 575.
72. 408 U.S. at 577. See also Olson v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 351 F. Supp. 430
(C.D. Cal. 1972), where the court said in dictum, "A one-year teaching contract that must
be renewed does not carry a reasonable expectation of re-employment. The property interest
expires on the same day as the contract." 351 F. Supp. at 433.
73. 408 U.S. at 577.
74. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
75. Id. at 599.
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interest, though not secured by a formal contractual tenure provi-
sion, was secured by a no less binding understanding fostered by the
college administration. In particular, the respondent alleged that
the college had a de facto tenure program, and that he had tenure
under that program.""6 So while a long employment record at some
other college may not be tantamount to a property right,77 a person
with a similar period of service at Odessa Junior College "had no
less a 'property' interest in continued employment than a formally
tenured teacher at other colleges, and had no less a procedural due
process right to a statement of reasons and a hearing before college
officials upon their decision not to retain him."78
An important conclusion to be derived from the Roth and
Sindermann decisions is that "property" is measurable only by an
objective standard. Persons claiming that they "expected" to be
kept on the job will not prevail unless they can point to extrinsic
facts to support that expectation. A quasi-contract or a mutual
understanding suffices in this regard.79 But while it is not manda-
tory that the agreement be in writing, there must be some sort of
agreement-a set of shared beliefs or understandings, however tacit
or implied,80 that amount to more than a "mere subjective 'expect-
ancy.' "81
A corollary is that property interests must actually attach be-
fore the courts can shield them. 82 Many recent cases concern indi-
viduals who did not receive a job or a promotion.8 3 To say that they
have a property interest is fallacious. Justice Stewart clearly stated
that "the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of prop-
76. Id. at 599-600.
77. See, e.g., Perkins v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 353 F. Supp. 618 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
78. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972). But note that the state may by
statute abrogate this situation: "If it is the law of Texas that a teacher in the respondent's
position has no contractuai or other claim to job tenure, the respondent's claim would be
defeated." Id. at 602 n.7.
79. Id. at 602.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 603.
82. Olson v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 351 F. Supp. 430 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
83. From the Central District of California alone, the following cases, heard recently,
involve persons suing for a promotion: Sherman v. City of Pasadena, __ F. Supp. -
(C.D. Cal. 1973); Olson v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 351 F. Supp. 430 (C.D. Cal. 1973);
Perkins v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 353 F. Supp. 618 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Crouch v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 73-118 DWW (C.D. Cal. 1973); Rossi v. TWA, 350 F. Supp. 1263 (C.D.
Cal. 1972).
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erty is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has
already acquired in specific benefits.""4 The words "already ac-
quired" are controlling in this passage. Without possession of or
imminent access to an interest, a person cannot rely on the
Constitution to protect his claim." Thus an individual whose em-
ployment contract is breached by the state has a cause of action.
So does a person who is promised, either explicitly or implicitly,
that his contract will be renewed." But a probationary employee
who is fired during his trial period, and who knows that this proce-
dure is authorized by statute, has no property interest;87 such cir-
cumstances resemble the employee who has applied unsuccessfully
for a promotion 11 The property must vest before the interest therein
can be asserted. "' This difference between preserving an interest
and attaining it must not be overlooked. "
84. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).
85. Olson v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 351 F. Supp. 430 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
86. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
87. Jenkins v. United States Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1973); Sayah v. United
States, 355 U.S. 1008 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
88. Olson v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 351 F. Supp. 430 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
89. This principle applies not only to employment, but elsewhere, as in the case of
social security benefits.
Appellant contends that the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act ought
not to be applied to her since her disability arose before those amendments were
enacted and thus served to divest her of a vested right in property without due
process. These rights are not vested and do not become vested until one has actually
established his eligibility. Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1959); King v. Finch, 428
F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970). Appellant having had no rights lost by those amendments
has no right to challenge them.
Harris v. Richardson, 468 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1973).
90. The Internal Revenue Service also recognizes a difference between attainment and
preservation with respect to a person's profession. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(f) (1957) states that
"expenses of taking special courses or training" are not allowable as deductions under § 212,
INT. REv. Con: or 1954. Yet Treas. Reg. 1.162-6 (1958) allows a professional to deduct under
§ 162(a) of the Code dues to professional societies, subscriptions to professional journals and
amounts currently expended for books whose useful life is short. One should be aware of the
difference in Treas. Reg. 1.162-5 (1958) between the expenses of retaining the taxpayer's
status or employment and the expense of education for a new position, a higher salary or an
advancement in position. Several cases illustrate the underlying principle: Coughlin v. CIR,
203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953) (partner's expense in going to the NYU Institute of Federal
'l'axation held deductil)le); Sandt v. CIR, 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962) (research chemist denied
deduction for cost of attending law school where primary purpose was to qualify for a new
post as patent chemist); Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1962) (law
school expenses incurred by IRS agent deductible on proof that purpose was improved skills
in regular employment); Marlor v. CIR, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958) (graduate study by college
professor on temporary appointment who cannot be reappointed or promoted without a
showing of substantial progress toward a doctorate, held, deductible).
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Later cases, as well as comments in Roth and Sindermann, go
on to say that the basis of this type of constitutional litigation must
be clear.' Specific facts must be alleged that show the court exactly
how the employer is curtailing an individual's property or liberty."
Since these issues usually are resolved on motions, attorneys would
be wise to frame pleadings that are more detailed than usual and
perhaps accompany them with affidavits. Without these safeguards
it is quite difficult to resist a motion for summary judgment or a
motion to dismiss.9 5
Liberty
For most of its judicial life, liberty has evolved in a similar
manner as property, with both concepts influencing and being influ-
enced by various philosophies and jurists." While the Supreme
Court has not attempted to define the word with particularity, they
have indicated that whatever connotation "liberty" has must be
broad indeed.97 Several meanings have been attached to the word,9"
but its definition remains unclear with respect to employment
cases. To date the courts have interferred only "[w]here a person's
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him. . . ."I" Even then what is
required is not redress or damages, but just "notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard,"' 00 the purpose of which is to provide the grievant
with a chance to clear his name.'0 '
91. Perkins v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 353 F. Supp. 618, 622 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
92. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 n.5 (1972).
93. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574 n.13 (1972).
94. Since these cases may be classified as civil rights actions, pleadings must be artfully
drawn. Allegations which are mere conclusions, unsupported by facts, do not suffice. See, e.g.,
Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 29-30 (9th Cir. 1962); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 294
(9th Cir. 1959); Reese v. Nixon, 347 F. Supp. 314, 316 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Freidman v. Younger,
282 F. Supp. 710, 714 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Fowler v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 638, 643-44
(C.D. Cal. 1966).
,db. Nee, e.g., 'erkins v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 353 F. Supp. 618, 621 n.4 (C.D.
Cal. 1973); FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
96. See notes 7-22 supra and accompanying text.
97. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
98. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
99. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
100. Id.
101. "Once a person has cleared his name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may
remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons." Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 n.12 (1972).
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Situations in which the Court has insisted that employees re-
ceive procedural safeguards have been heinous to the point where
the state's action is tantamount to a "badge of infamy.""'2 The
use of anonymous informers would qualify for this category where
their invective destroys a grievant's chances for employment."'" So
would an overly careless designation of a group as subversive when
few or no facts exist to support the charge.'04 Similarly, statutes that
bar disloyal persons from public employment may not be drafted so
as to classify knowing members of an association with those who
innocently joined. 15
The source of all these opinions is an official act which degrades
the complainants, not necessarily to the degree that would attach
were they criminally convicted, 06 but enough to haunt them in later
endeavors. Thus no liberty interest exists in cases where an em-
ployee, for some reason, is blocked from employment at one estab-
lishment while remaining quite free and able to work elsewhere.0 7
"It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived
of 'liberty' when he simply, is not rehired in one job but remains free
as before to seek another."''0 Nor does it matter that a record of
102. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
103. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 352-53 (1954).
If the sources of information need protection, they should be kept secret. But once
they are used to destroy a man's reputation and deprive him of his "liberty," they
must be put to the test of due process of law. The use of faceless informers is wholly
at war with that concept. [Douglas, J., concurring opinion].
Id. at 352.
104. Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 137-38 (1950).
105. Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
There can be no dispute about the consequences visited upon a person excluded from
public employment on disloyalty grounds. In the view of the community, the stain
is a deep one; indeed, it has become a badge of infamy.
Id. at 190-91.
106. Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1950). "[T]he right
to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may
not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our
society." IFrankfurter, J. concurring]. Id. at 168. See generally FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 163 (1928).
107. In Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1960), a short order cook's identifi-
cation credentials were withdrawn for security reasons, yet the record showed that no stigma
accompanied the act. Her employer even offered to place her at another facility. The Court
found no denial of liberty, reasoning that "All that was denied her was the opportunity to
work at one isolated and specific military installation." Id. at 896. "[Tlhis is not a case where
the government action has operated to bestow a badge of disloyalty or infamy, with an
attendant foreclosure from other employment opportunity." Id. at 898.
108. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972).
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nonretention might make somebody slightly less attractive to future
employers.""' "[A]ny reason [for a dismissal] other than a reduc-
tion in force is likely to be of some extent a reflection on a proba-
tioner's ability, temperament, or character."0 Nonetheless not
every dismissal attains constitutional proportions. "
Disagreement exists in connection with the scope of these Su-
preme Court rulings. In the employment context, "liberty" appears
to be a concept whose meaning is dependent on subtleties within
each individual factual setting."2 Perhaps this is true because re-
garding employment, the concept is relatively new. Nonetheless cer-
tain principles are crystallizing. No one loses his liberty when he
fails to receive a promotion" 3 unless he can prove additional rele-
vant facts."' A person who is told that his credentials are substand-
ard does not automatically derive a cause of action unless the criti-
cism is unduly harsh or unnecessarily publicized."' Although no
case has explicitly drawn the analogy, the courts seem to be follow-
ing the laws of defamation." 6 An employer is privileged to chastise
his staff provided that he does not spread his sour judgment further
than necessary." 7 Conceivably a stinging, abusive letter shown only
to the employee would not usurp his liberty while a polite, but
widely published dismissal note would. The present law requires the
employer to act reasonably and refrain from curtailing future job
opportunities, and it was precisely this reasonable behavior that
finally defeated Professor Roth at the Supreme Court."'
109. Id. at 574 n.13; cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1956).
110. Medoff v. Freeman, 362 F.2d 472, 476 (1st Cir. 1966). This would logically hold
true for permanent employees as well.
111. Jenkins v. United States Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1973).
112. Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
113. That he has been denied a position more prestigious, more secure, and
possibly more lucrative than what he already occupies, without more, does not mean
that he has been deprived of a constitutionally protected interest. If it did, then any
nigh bunui eniur applying as a freshman and turned down without a hearing or
statement of reasons by a state university would have a cause of action under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Olson v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 351 F. Supp. 430, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
114. See notes 119-21 infra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text. See also Sayah v. United States,
355 F. Supp. 1008 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
116. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, §§ 106-11 (3d ed. 1964).
117. See note 107 supra. See also Sayah v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 1008, 1015 (C.D.
Cal. 1973).
118. Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-employ
the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his
[Vol. 8
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Current interpretations of liberty leave unclear the remedy that
is available to one who is terminated and, through no fault of the
employer, is precluded from similar positions elsewhere. Not long
ago an Illinois district court facing just such a problem, vacated a
motion for summary judgment which it previously had granted."'
In reversing itself the court explained that the litigation "presented
genuine issues of material fact-the degree to which plaintiffs' car-
eer opportunities have been foreclosed and the extent to which this
has been caused by their termination."' 20 The judge grappled with
the question whether the termination deprived the plaintiffs of
other opportunities. The unresolved issue in Roth, he concluded, is
"Idjoes a substantial adverse affect [sic] upon career opportuni-
ties which has been proven to have been caused by termination of
employment constitute a state-imposed restriction upon liberty
which requires a hearing under the due process clause?"'' Shortly
after this a United States district court in California handed down
a decision that attacked the reasoning in the Illinois case, but did
not assume a totally opposite stance in its holding. 2 That case
involved a French professor who had taught for seven years at UCLA
before learning that she would not receive tenure. She alleged in her
complaint an inability to obtain another academic appointment,
but did not support her allegation with affidavits or other mate-
rial." :' At the hearing, her counsel offered to prove that a professor
who is asked to leave after so many years is virtually unemployable,
at least in Southern California. 4 Dismissing the complaint without
prejudice, the court indicated that if she had a case at all, it would
be that relieving the plaintiff after seven years is equivalent to
branding her with a hopeless stigma.2 5
If this is the law, it means that certain people, by virtue of their
seniority or the paucity of jobs in their field, cannot be fired. A
freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. The State, for exam-
ple, did not invoke any regulations to bar the respondent from all other public
employment in state universities. Had it done so, this again, would be a different
case.
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972).
119. Franz v. Board of Educ. of Riverside School Dist. No. 96, No. 72 C151 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 10, 1972).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Perkins v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 353 F. Supp. 618, 622-23 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
123. Id. Plaintiff's complaint at 10.
124. Id. at 624.
125. Id. at 622.
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liberal interpretation might go further and impose on employers an
affirmative duty to discover whether everyone on their payroll is
rehirable. While it is true that the state may not foreclose a range
of opportunities in a manner that contravenes the right to due pro-
cess,'26 logic dictates that the state should not have to make sure
that the job market can absorb its discarded help.'2 7 The burden on
the government, let alone other employers, would be intolerable.,"
We doubt that the frontiers of liberty extend that far. Roth pre-
cluded such an extrapolation by recognizing that non-retention ob-
viously must reduce a person's attractiveness, while maintaining
that this alone does not curtail liberty.'29 What may curtail liberty
is termination accompanied by malice'30 or undue publicity.'"' As
one judge quipped, "Even the Declaration of Independence guaran-
tees only 'the pursuit of happiness,' not the millenium itself."'32
One's liberty evaporates when his ability to pursue falters.
126. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1956).
127. Perkins v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 353 F. Supp. 618, 623-24 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
128. (f. Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County. 28 Cal. App. 3d 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121
(1972):
Modern government offers its citizens a wide spectrum of benefits, including
public employment, public contracts, public education, tax exemptions, loans subsi-
dies, franchises, and licenses of all kinds. In view of the number, sweep and scope of
these benefits we do not believe an evidentiary hearing can be routinely required each
time an application for one of those benefits is denied. Were the law otherwise the
resulting burden on government would be overwhelming. For example, an affidavit
in the case at bench indicates that in the County of Los Angeles alone over 7000
applications for general relief are received each month, of which less than 1000 are
accepted. Thus, the grant of Zobriscky's petition would mandate over 6000 eviden-
tiary hearings each month for the County of Los Angeles for this one benefit offered
by government. The resulting increase in the cost of administration of the general
relief program brought about by the cost of such hearings would necessarily reduce
the net amount of moneys available for general relief purposes, and in this sense
mandatory evidentiary hearings would work at cross purposes to the primary objec-
tive of welfare itself.
Id. at 933, 105 Cal. Reptr. at 123.
12t2'. LIuaiU of 1lugu.,ts Ut 0tdtt Cw..Uveg V. Ruth.1, 4tOO U.S. 5G4t, 574 11.13 (1972I).
130. Id. at 573.
The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against
him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community. It
did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for example, that he had
been guilty of dishonesty or immorality. Had it done so, this would be a different
case.
Id.
131. Sayah v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 1008, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
132. Perkins v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 353 F. Supp. 618, 624 (C.D. Cal.
1973).
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REVIEW BOARDS, AGENCIES, AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The growth of quasi-judicial panels has created a new reason
for limiting federal jurisdiction over employment disputes. Not only
can most cases be handled by those bodies, but the law provides
that incidents within a board's jurisdiction often must be passed
upon by the appropriate administrative machinery before a plaintiff
can pursue his remedies in federal court. Two of the better known
review boards occur in connection with the airline and railway in-
dustries.
Railway and Airline Disputes
In 1934 Congress amended the Railway Labor Act, creating the
National Railroad Adjustment Board'33 to settle so-called minor dis-
putes between individual employees and the carriers.'34 Two years
later the legislature extended the Railway Labor Act to cover the
then-fledgling air transportation industry.' 35 In each case the con-
gressional action was grounded in a desire to curb a growing backlog
of disputes. The original Railroad Adjustment Board was intended
to be a lightning rod for a vast number of small skirmishes that had
previously found their way to federal court. Thirty years later, how-
ever, even that organization needed relief: railroad employees some-
times had to wait as long as 10 years before obtaining a decision on
their claims. The First Division lagged approximately seven and a
half years behind.'3" Accordingly, in 1966 Congress amended the act
to provide for a series of special adjustment boards. 37
Judicial review of railway board findings is limited,'" and dis-
133. Act of June 21, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-441, 48 Stat. 1189-93, amending 45 U.S.C.
§ 153 (1926) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1970)). Pursuant to subsection (a) of this section,
the board consists of 34 members, 17 from the carriers and 17 from the employees' labor
organizations. Four divisions are established under § 153(h), with each division covering
different types of employees.
134. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. New York Cent. R.R., 246 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.
1957). cert. denied, :155 U.S. 877. Minor disputes would include grievances related to interpre-
tation or application of agreements directly regarding pay, rules and working conditions, and
may also comprehend agreements as to individual promotions and terminations.
135. Act of April 10, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-487, 49 Stat. 1189-91, amending 45 U.S.C.
§§ 181-88 (1934)(codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1970)). See International Ass'n of Machin-
ists, AFL-CIO v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 683 (1963).
136. 1966 United States Code Congressional and Administrative News 2286.
137. Act of June 20, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-456, 48 Stat. 1193, amending 45 U.S.C. § 153
(1964)(codified at 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1970)).
138. Slocum v. Delaware, L&W. R.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950); Van Zandt v. Railway
Express Agency, 99 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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trict courts do not have jurisdiction over actions based upon wrong-
ful discharges either for reinstatement or for damages.'39 The provi-
sions as applied to air carrier employees are equally binding and
final." While there may be an instance when the aggrieved party
has the option of choosing between federal court and the adjustment
boards,"' this does not mean that the plaintiff can pursue both
remedies to completion. Rather he is put to an election and must
refrain from switching forums if his first effort falters. "2 This is
analogous to the situation where federal and state courts hold con-
current jurisdiction "3 and the judgment obtained in one court is res
judicata in the other.' Whichever rationale a court adopts, the
result is the same: a grievant is precluded from multiple litigation. 5
Civil Service-Promotion
Similar restraints exist in the civil service context. In promo-
tion for example, the Civil Service Commission has statutory au-
thority to ascertain what credentials are required for a particular
position, to classify newly created positions into their payscale sys-
tem, and to change positions among the classes and grades when
facts so warrant. "6 More important, an employee affected by these
decisions may request the Commission to "exercise the authority
granted to it by . . . this section and the Commission shall act on
the request.""' Although this language is somewhat ambiguous, the
Ninth Circuit has interpreted it to mean that "Congress has vested
the Commission with full power to hear employees' complaints of
139. Morrisette v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 299 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 874 (1962).
140. Sigfred v. Pan American World Airways, 230 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 925; Rossi v. Trans World Airlines, 350 F. Supp. 1263 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
141. Rosen v. Eastern Airlines, 400 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1968).
142. Rossi v. Trans World Airlines, 350 F. Supp. 1263 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
143. Washington v. Aerojet-General Corp., 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
i 44. Pennsyivania G.en. Cas. Cu. v. Pennsylvanlia ex rei Schnader, 294 U.S. i89 0955).
145. Rossi v. Trans World Airlines, 350 F. Supp. 1263 (C.D. Cal. 1972); see also Bower
v. Eastern Airlines, 214 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954):
Whether we say that the party is bound by his own voluntary election between an
administrative and an alternative judicial remedy, or describe the party who initi-
ated the administrative proceeding as estopped from denying its agreed final and
binding character, or view this as an application of the rationale of res judicata in a
new area, we are satisfied that the court should declare and enforce a rule of repose
against the re-examination of plaintifis claim in this case.
Id. at 626.
146. Classification Act of 1949, 5 U.S.C. § 5112(a) (1966).
147. Id. § 5112(b).
[Vol. 8
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non-compliance with the Classification Act and the standards pro-
mulgated thereunder, to investigate such complaints and to make
a binding adjudication thereon. (5 U.S.C. § 5112(b))."111 An earlier
decision, Hardy v. Rossell, ,49 tallies with the Ninth Circuit's reluct-
ance to become involved. In that case government employees
brought an action challenging the downgrading of their positions by
the Commission and asked for an injunction pendente lite. How-
ever, the employees also had filed "timely administrative appeals"
to the Commission. Reasoning that since the law provided that upon
successful administrative appeal the employees would be restored
to their former positions with back pay, the court held that plaintiffs
were not subject to any irreparable harm and refused to interfere,
pending exhaustion of their administrative remedies.
What remains open is whether employees can bypass the Com-
mission channels and file their complaints directly in federal court.
Decisions from railway and pilot disputes indicate by analogy that
they might have this option,"'"' although the authors wonder if it is
the proper function of a reviewing court to pass on the qualifications
of an employee for a particular position.' 5' To create extra-judicial
panels and fail to require that grievants initiate their cases there
does nothing more than duplicate effort and prolong disputes. It
would be better to conclude that, absent any contrary statutory
provisions, federal review of the Commission's decisions regarding
promotion should be narrowed severely. This would square with the
settled law that any agency or arbitration decision can be chal-
lenged in court when the board acted capriciously or otherwise did
not follow its own procedure.' 2
Civil Service-Termination
Similar review machinery exists to handle termination disputes
occurring within civil service agencies.'53 To be sure, a person is
entitled to judicial review when he suffers "legal wrong because of
agency action or [he is] adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
148. White v. United States Civil Service Comm'n 468 F.2d 1357, 1358 (9th Cir. 1972).
149. 135 F. Stipp. 260 (S.I).N.Y. 1955).
150. See notes 135-39 supra and accompanying text.
151. For a negative answer, sce Bookman v. United States, 453 F.2d 1263 (C1. Cl. 1972).
152. See notes 167-72 infra and accompanying text; see also Bielec v. United States,
456 F.2d 691) (Ci. (. 1972).
153. We use the term "agency" as defined in Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(b) (1966).
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action within the meaning of a relevant statute."'54 But this does not
mean that a grievant automatically has access to the federal courts
or that he has any more rights than he had under the previously
existing law of judicial review.' Limiting language appears in the
Administrative Procedure Act,"'5 where only six grounds are cited
upon which the reviewing tribunal may upset an agency action,
finding or conclusion.5 7 Underlying these limitations is the fact that
like promotion, "[d]ismissal from federal employment is largely a
matter of executive agency discretion . . . .The scope of judicial
review is narrow."'5 8 It follows that the conclusions of each agency's
machinery should be treated the way arbitration agreements are
handled in court.
Advantages of Review Board Action
Even if federal judicial review power over these boards were not
154. Id. § 702 (1966).
155. See Olin Industries v. NLRB, 72 F. Supp. 225 (D. Mass. 1947).
156. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966). The Act provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject
to trial Ce novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or
those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of
prejudicial error.
157. First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield, N.C. v. First Nat'l Bank of Eastern N.C., 232 F.
Supp. 725 (E.D.N.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965).
158. Toohey v. Nitze, 429 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.. 1970); see also the Legislative
History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Subcommittee on Labor of the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, November 1972, at 811: "It
has been well-recognized that the same requirements applicable to due process in the courts
do not necessarily apply to all other judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings." e.g., L.B. Wilson
Inc. v. F.C.C., 170 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1948): "[Djue process is not necessarily judicial
process." (Emphasis added.)
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restricted by law, it should be narrowed for three policy reasons.
One involves crowded trial schedules, to which we referred earlier.'59
Easing congestion was one reason why Congress established the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The legislators were
keenly aware of delays, sometimes as much as 35 months, before
cases were finally closed.'6 ° Promotion and termination cases are
increasing rapidly. The federal bench should react as Congress did
when discrimination filings began to increase: by directing as many
cases as possible to specialized tribunals.
The second reason involves the high degree of skill and exper-
tise available through use of specialized review boards. Judges by
necessity have to be generalists, with an acceptable but hardly ex-
ceptional knowledge of the laws which they interpret. Special arbi-
trators are familiar with the practical intricacies of their particular
occupations.' They understand the peculiarities that often may be
dispositive of a case. The result is that these boards tend to be fair
for both sides, and the process itself is quicker and cheaper than
full-scale litigation.' 2
Congress has acknowledged the superior knowledge and experi-
ence of members of special review boards. For example, in drafting
the Administrative Procedure Act, Congress required only that
agency decisions be supported by "substantial evidence.' 6 This
concept has been defined by the Supreme Court as something less
than the weight of the evidence, "and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency's finding from being supported by substan-
tial evidence."' 4 The standard was adopted to free reviewing courts
159. Supra note 1; see also Can Arbitration East Docket Backlog? A Symposium, 25
Mo. B.J. 481 (1969).
160. Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, supra note
158, at 802, 804.
161. Rossi v. Trans World Airlines, 350 F. Supp. 1263 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
162. See Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on the Merits, 63 HARV. L. REV.
681 (1970).
163. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324 § 10(e), 60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1964)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966)).
164. Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1965). "We have defined
,substantial evidence' as 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade-
quate to support a conclusion.' Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229.
'It must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the
conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.' Labor Board v. Columbian
Enameling and Stamping Co.. 306 U.S. 292, 300." Id. at 619-20. "Although these two cases
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from the time consuming task of weighing the evidence and also to
give "proper respect to the expertise of the administrative tri-
bunal." " '", Even before this legislation, courts placed a premium on
agency expertise. Some courts even used the substantial evidence
test before the Administrative Procedure Act was passed."' The
point to be stressed is that when an issue is close, the judgment of
experts in the field deserves respect.
None of this means that federal courts should abdicate their
responsibility to make sure board decisions are grounded in fairness.
They still possess the power to upset a clearly erroneous or fraudu-
lent finding. For example, decisions by Railway or Pilot System
adjustment boards are binding on the judiciary unless the board
failed to observe due process."t 7 One court has said that judicial
inquiry ends once it is found that 1) the board's procedure and
award conformed to the statute and any agreement, 2) the award
confined itself to the letter of submission and 3) the award was not
arrived at by fraud and corruption.'" s Other courts have limited
review even more severely. In Bower v. Eastern Airlines, ," the court
stated that its inquiry into the due process question only required
it to "determine whether the Board had given the plaintiff a full and
were decided before the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, they are considered
authoritative in defining the words 'substantial evidence' as used in the Act. 4 Davis, Admin-
istraltive Law 'Treatise Sec. 29.02." Id. at 620 n.18.
165. Id. at 620. See also, e.g., F.T.C. v. Mary Carter Paint Co., :182 U.S. 46, 48-49
(1965). "''Tr he Commission is often in a better position than are courts to determine when
a practice is "deceptive" within the meaning of the Act.' Federal Trade Commission v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385. There was substantial evidence in the record to
support t he ( Con mission's finding. The Court of Appeals should have sustained it.'" Id.
at ,8-9. But see U niversal Camera Corporation v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951): "The Board's
tindings arc entitled to respect; but they must nonetheless be set aside when the record before
a ('Curt of Appeals clearly precludes the Board's decision from being justified by a fair
esinmate of the worth of' the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters
wit hin its special competence or both." Id. at 490. This suggests that the hench intervene
,liLv iln cases ofl icar error; and de same opinion notes that thespecial agencies are in general
"eq(uipped or intornmed Iby experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose
tindings wit hin that field carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess
and therefore must respect." Id. at 488,
166. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 483, 490 (1951); Consolo v.
Federal Maritime Comm'n., 383 U.S. 607, 620 n.19 (1965).
167. Rossi v. Trans World Airlines, 350 F. Supp. 1263 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Rosen v. East-
ern Airlines, 400 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1968).
168. Rosen v. Eastern Airlines, 400 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1968); Farris v. Alaska Airlines,
113 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Wash. 1953).
169. Bower v. Eastern Airlines, 214 F.2d 623, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1954).
[Vol. 8
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fair hearing and had exercised its honest judgment in reaching its
conclusions and decision on the full record."' 70
A parallel rule exists with respect to other federal agencies.
Courts must ascertain whether the agency has exceeded its statu-
tory powers or has complied with legal requirements.'7' No judge can
substitute his opinion for the agency's. He is obligated only to deter-
mine if the agency abused its authority by acting capriciously or by
depriving someone of a substantive right.'72
CONCLUSION
Early in this article the authors voiced the belief that most
promotion and termination cases involving liberty and property in-
terests do not belong in the federal courts. While such a statement
is amenable to a spate of reasons involving public policy, it should
be clear that independent of any social reasons, the law supports
this contention. The area is admittedly new, and conflicts are bound
to emerge.'73 But the two most recent Supreme Court decisions'
indicate a restrictive interpretation. This is as it should be. Govern-
ment is not in the business of assuring happiness; and no public
employer is obliged to make certain that a person on his staff will
achieve an executive position, let alone remain employable. Making
sure that people are treated equitably is burdensome enough. To
stretch liberty and property any further departs from fairness and
approaches the paternal.
While the statutes indicate that in certain areas independent
review boards enjoy primary jurisdiction, equally pressing policy
arguments exist. Reducing congestion and utilizing experienced
arbitrators are no less compelling than the neutral principles of
170. Id.
171. See note 150 supra; see also Mulry v. Driver, 366 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1966).
172. Bielec v. United States, 456 F.2d 690 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Suess v. Pugh, 245 F. Supp.
661 (N.). W. Va. 1965). Also note that in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 923 (1971), the court decided that judges should
interfere in the circumstances previously mentioned, but also when "it becomes aware espe-
cially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look'
at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making." 444
F.2d at 851.
173. See, e.g., the disparity involving "liberty" in Perkins v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 353 F. Supp. 618 (C.D. Cal. 1973) and Franz v. Board of Educ. of Riverside School Dist.
No. 96. No. 72 CI51, (N.D. III., August 10, 1972).
174. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
19741
Mohr and Willett: Constitutional and Procedural Aspects of Employee Acces to the Fe
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1974
330 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
administrative due process. The machinery exists, supported by
law, to limit the mounting employment cases. What must accom-
pany it is judicial willingness to interpret the Supreme Court
strictly and perhaps even to invoke sanctions when it is reasonably
believed that a complaint is frivolous. 75 Only then can this new area
in the field of employer-employee relations be absorbed painlessly
into the federal docket.
175. See, e.g., Suel v. Addington, 465 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1972), a case in which plaintiff
contended that his employment with the State of Alaska was terminated as the result of
conspiracy founded upon racial discrimination. The district court found that his claims were
frivolous and that his counsel had too vexatiously multiplied the proceedings as to increase
costs. It held appellees entitled to costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 in the sum of $100. Affirming
this decision, the Ninth Circuit commented that "[ulpon this record this did not constitute
abuse of discretion." Id. at 889.
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